Hetzelfde sentiment dat al maanden lang de Arabische wereld in beroering brengt, de motivatie van de aanhoudende protesten in Griekenland, de studentenbewegingen in Brittannië en Italië en de Franse betogingen tegen Sarkozy, dit gevoel verspreidt zich nu ook in Spanje.

Dit zijn geen dagen van business as usual, de vertrouwde routines van de Spaanse ‘marktdemocratie’ en de electorale en media rituelen zijn op hun kop gezet door onverwachte straatprotesten. Deze ‘opstand van verontwaardiging’ is nu al een bron van zorg voor de politieke elites, zoals altijd wanneer mensen besluiten het idee van democratie serieus te nemen.  Niemand had deze protesten verwacht. De betogingen van 15 mei waren via internet georganiseerd door een beweging die zich ‘echte democratie’ noemt. De kritiek op de rol van de banken en de politieke elite in de huidige economische crisis stonden centraal in de oproepen.

Het aantal betogingen en de omvang ervan overtrof ieders verwachtingen: 25.000 in Madrid, 15.000 in Barcelona. De bezetting van het Plaza del Sol na afloop van de demonstratie in Madrid was spontaan en het politieoptreden tegen de bezetting leidde tot een verspreiding van het protest. Na 15 mei werden er verschillende tentenkampen gebouwd, met als meest belangrijke voorbeelden die in Madrid en Barcelona.

Twee jaar geleden, bij het uitbreken van de crisis, beleefden de machtigen der aarde een korte paniekaanval, geschokt als zij waren door de omvang van de onverwachte crisis. In plaats van een uitbraak van protest waren we echter getuige van holle retoriek over hervormingen en van dubbelhartige excuses. Ondertussen werd het financiële systeem weer opgekalefaterd. Na de uitbraak van de crisis bleef het protest tegen de bezuinigingsmaatregelen zwak, er gaapte een kloof tussen de alom gedeelde scepsis over het bestaande economische model en de vertaling hiervan in collectieve actie. Angst in moeilijke tijden, het verlies van geloofwaardigheid van de vakbonden, het ontbreken van inspirerende voorbeelden en een individualistische levenshouding zijn belangrijke delen van een verklaring voor het groeien van deze kloof.

De huidige uitbraak van protest in Spanje is echter niet zonder voorgeschiedenis. Jaren van kleinschalig activisme door alternatieve netwerken en bewegingen en kleinere protesten hielden de vlam van protest brandend. De algemene staking op 29 september 2010 toonde dat er een groter potentieel was. Het akkoord dat de grote bonden, de CCOO en de UGT, hierna sloten met de regering deed zware schade aan wat hen nog aan prestige restte. De jongeren die nu in navolging van de Arabische protesten tentenkampen opzetten hebben geen vertrouwen in deze bonden.

Een eerste stap

Een gedeeld gevoel van verontwaardiging is een van de kenmerken van de protesten – maar er is meer nodig dan alleen onvrede: we moeten geloven in het nut van collectieve actie, in de mogelijkheid om te winnen. Al jarenlang kennen de sociale beweging in Spanje niks dan nederlagen. Het gebrek aan voorbeelden die het potentieel van collectieve actie kunnen tonen en de grenzen van het haalbare oprekken woog als een molensteen op het verzet tegen de gevolgen van de crisis. Daarom is het voorbeeld van de Arabische revoluties zo belangrijk: deze tonen wat mogelijk is als mensen in beweging komen. Deze revoluties, en de minder bekende overwinningen in IJsland op de bankiers en de politieke elite, waren vanaf het begin referentiepunten voor de demonstranten. Naast het geloof dat het mogelijk is om te winnen, dat we de loop der dingen kunnen veranderen, staat de vrees om nog meer te verliezen in een tijd van crisis. ‘Zonder vrees’ is een van de meest gehoorde slogans – een grote meerderheid van de werkende bevolking is bang, een gevoel dat tot apathie of xenofobe reacties leidt. Maar de mobilisaties sinds 15 mei en de tentenkampen zijn een krachtig tegengif.

Jongeren spelen een centrale rol in de deze beweging, een nieuwe generatie activisten is naar voren getreden. Maar het gaat om meer dan een jongerenbeweging, het is een beweging tegen de crisis van het huidige economische model en de pogingen om werknemers, jonge werknemers voorop, te laten betalen voor deze crisis. Het protest van jongeren kan als een katalysator voor wijder verspreid sociaal protest werken. Opiniepeilingen tonen veel sympathie voor de protesten.

Terugkeer van sociaal verzet

Sinds de opkomst van de andersglobaliseringsbeweging, meer dan tien jaar geleden, heeft Spanje niets gezien dat qua dynamiek en spontaniteit vergelijkbaar is met de huidige beweging. De andersglobaliseringsbewegingbeweging kreeg in Spanje een massaal karakter met de demonstraties tegen de topbijeenkomst van de Wereldbank in juni 2001. Tien jaar later zien we een nieuwe beweging geboren worden en in plaats van nostalgie is er reden voor blijdschap. De bijeenkomsten op pleinen verspreid door het land tonen dat er verandering in de lucht hangt: na de Seattle en de Genua generatie volgt de ‘Tahrir generatie’. Net als de andersglobaliseringsbeweging is de huidige beweging internationaal georiënteerd en keert zij zich tegen een wereldwijd kapitalisme en een politieke elite die alleen de kapitalistische belangen verdedigt. Deze politieke kliek is het centrale mikpunt van kritiek. ‘Wij zijn geen koopwaar van politici en bankiers’ is een van de voornaamste slogans. Alhoewel soms nog onhandig verwoordt is fundamentele kritiek op het huidige economische model niet te missen. ‘Capitalism? Game over’.

De toekomst van deze beweging is niet te voorzien. De dag van de verkiezingen, 22 mei, zal een belangrijk moment zijn. Het is noodzakelijk nieuwe momenten voor massaal protest vast te stellen om het momentum vast te houden. De tentenkampen kunnen een plaats zijn voor het creëren van contacten, het bouwen van bruggen tussen mensen in verzet tegen bezuinigingen op allerlei publieke voorzieningen zoals gezondheidszorg en educatie. Op deze manier kunnen activisten die nog niet georganiseerd zijn in aanraking komen met de alternatieve vakbondsbeweging, met burgercomités et cetera. Tien jaar na de opkomst van de andersglobaliseringsbeweging, twee jaar na de uitbraak van de crisis, zien we de terugkeer van protest van onderop. V

Josep María Antentas is redacteur van de het tijdschift Viento Sur en doceert sociologie aan de Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona. Esther Vivas is verbonden aan het Centrum voor de Studie van Sociale Bewegingen aan de Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Dit artikel is een bewerking van stukken die eerder verschenen op internationalviewpoint.org.

‘De essentie van de revolutie in Tunesië kan in drie eisen worden samengevat: banen, vrijheid en nationale waardigheid. De revolutie begon met de symbolische daad van een hoogopgeleide jongere die zichzelf in brand stak. Hij staat symbool voor werkeloze jongeren die, voordat de weg gesloten wordt, naar Italië en de rest van Europa proberen te gaan. Na zijn daad volgde een explosie van volkswoede, vooral van de jongeren in de ‘vergeten’, achtergestelde regio’s als Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Gafsa enzovoorts, en in de arbeiderswijken van de grote steden als Tunis, Nabeul, Sfax en Sousse. Steeds waren het jongeren die het eerst de strijd aangingen.’

Hoe hebben deze opstandige jongeren de politie-staat kunnen trotseren?

‘Het is correct om te zeggen dat de revolutie geen leiding had, er was geen politiek leiderschap. Maar er was een ‘achterhoede’ die de volksbeweging s teunde. De opstandige jongeren werden al snel geconfronteerd met repressie – toen trokken zij zich terug, om te hergroeperen, in de basisstructuren van de Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT – Algemene Unie van Tunesische Arbeiders). In de regio’s waar het om gaat is niet veel industrie en de jongeren maakten vooral contact met vakbondsleden uit het onderwijs, mensen die vaak voortkwamen uit de studentenbeweging van de jaren tachtig en beïnvloed waren door radicaal links. De jaren negentig waren de zwaarste jaren van repressie – 40 mensen werden doodgemarteld, er waren 30.000 politieke gevangenen – en gedur ende dit decennium gingen deze mensen de vakbeweging in, met al hun politieke, linkse bagage.’

Jouw organisatie is gevormd in de beweging tegen Ben Ali.

‘Ja, de LGO is gevormd tijdens de revolutie maar onze activisten kwamen niet uit de lucht vallen, ze waren al bekend vanwege hun verzet tegen het regi me. Ze waren allemaal al bekend als leiders in de vakbeweging, in de feministische beweging enzovoorts.’

Jij hebt de rol van vakbon dsactivisten en de erfgenamen van de studentenbeweging in de jaren tachtig beklemtoond, maar deze mensen werden normaliter niet gezien als de voornaamste oppositie tegen Ben Ali.

‘Toen de westerse media het had over de oppositie tegen Ben Ali spraken ze over mijn broer, de journalist Tawfik Ben Brik, over de mensenrechtenactivist Moncef Marzouki toen de politie zijn bril brak of over mijzelf, een advocaat, toen mijn paspoort geweigerd werd. Maar ze noemden niet de stakingen van 100.000 leraren tegen het bezoek van de Israëlische delegatie aan Tunesië of de algemene staking van de UGTT. De media sprak over een kleine, moedige kring van oppositie activisten maar niet over de rol van de arbeiders. Waarom? Omdat deze kleine kring geen bedreiging vormde, zij konden maximaal 300 mensen op de been brengen, de meeste van middelbare leeftijd.’

Welke rol speelde de vakbond in de val van Ben Ali?

‘De politieke geschiedenis van Tunesië is niet te begrijpen als je de rol van de arbeidersbeweging niet in aanmerking neemt. De vakbeweging dateert uit 1924 en is daarmee een van de oudste in de Arabische regio. De UGTT werd opgericht in 1946. De vakbondsactivist Tahar Haddad was in 1929 de eerste die volledige gelijkheid van mannen en vrouwen eiste.

De drie regionale stakingen van de UGTT waren cruciaal in het veranderen van de machtsbalans in het voordeel van de revolutie. De vakbondsbureacratie werd geconfronteerd met sterke bonden, geleid door radicale linkse activisten, vooral in het onderwijs, en kon hen niet negeren toen zij opriepen tot een algemene staking.

In tegenstelling tot Egypte hoeven wij in Tunesië niet vanaf het begin te beginnen met het organiseren van arbeiders, belangrijke delen van de arbeidersklasse zijn al georganiseerd in bonden geleid door radicaal links en we zien een proces van radicalisering onder de leden van de UGTT.’

Wat zijn in deze periode de voornaamste uitdagingen?

‘Op het moment staan we voor twee problemen. Ten eerste was Tunesië geen eenvoudige eenpartijstaat, het was een politie-staat. Het lot van de milities van het regime werd niet bepaald door de implosie van Ben Ali’s RCD (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, Constitutioneel Democratische Verzameling) – de milities zijn verbonden aan kopstukken van de politie die zwarte markt controleren. Ten tweede is Tunesië zeer afhankelijk van de Europese Unie en van Sarkozy’s Frankrijk en Berlusconi’s Italië. Ben Ali kwam in 1987 aan de macht om de uitvoering van de economische liberalisering af te dwingen, hij was niet een dictator met een eigen agenda maar een specialist in repressie ten dienste van de Wereldbank, het Internationaal Monetair Fonds en ook Frankrijk.’

Wat zijn op het moment de discussies in de beweging?

‘We bediscussiëren de meest dringen taken, zoals de ommanteling van de RCD en het apparaat van de politie-staat, banen voor werklozen, het onder arbeiderscontrole nationaliseren van eigendommen van de families die bondgenoten waren van Ben Ali, het annuleren van de buitenlandse schuld enzovoorts. Daarnaast is er het voorstel om een ‘Nationaal Congres voor de Verdediging van de Revolutie’ te organiseren waarin alle vakbonden, mensenrechtengroepen, progressieve partijen en vooral de autonome zelforganisaties van de beweging plaats kunnen nemen.’

Welke vorm nemen deze zelforganisaties?

‘Deze structuren werden opgebouwd in de loop van de beweging, het eerst in Sidi Bouzid, in Menzel Bouzaïane, in Agareb, in Thala, waar heftige confrontaties met de politie plaatsvonden en mensen zichzelf organiseerden om zich te verdedigen.

Na de val van Ben Ali gingen milities en delen van de politie over tot geweld teneinde angst te zaaien. Verspreid over Tunesië organiseerden mensen zichzelf om hun buurt, hun school en hun publieke voorzieningen te beschermen. De partij van Ben Ali controleerde de buurten: toen deze ineenstortte moesten de mensen de organisatie overnemen. De kantoren van de RCD werden de kantoren van het volk. Mensen kwamen bij elkaar, discussieerden met elkaar, iedereen sprak over de regering, over Ben Ali, ministers en hun banden met de Verenigde Staten en Frankrijk enzovoorts. In sommige buurten is de organisatie meer spontaan, elders werden besturen verkozen. De comités werden het feitelijke bestuur, het was een vorm van zelf-organisatie om essentiële dagelijkse taken als zelfverdediging tegen de milities te organiserenen tegelijkertijd sociale, politieke en andere kwesties te bespreken.

Zoals in elke vorm van strijd en zelf-organisatie is de ontwikkeling oneven, afhankelijk van de mate van radicalisering van de plaatselijke bevolking, maar het proces heeft wortels in het hele land, vooral in Agared, Thala, Menzel Bouzaïane, en delen van Tunis. Daarnaast zien we vormen van zelf-organisatie in de publieke instellingen, zoals bijvoorbeeld het optreden van vakbondsactivisten die het ontslag van corrupte managers en vervanging door de meest geschikte kandidaten voorstellen. Werknemers van Tunisie-Télécom eisten dat de dertig procent van het bedrijf die geprivatiseerd is weer genationaliseerd wordt en de meest corrupte managers verwijderd worden.’

De zelf-organisatie heeft zich uitgebreid naar de media?

‘Onder Ben Ali werd de pres gecontroleerd door de politieke politie en deze bestaat nog steeds. Maar bij veel kranten zien we arbeiders en journalisten meer vrijheid afdwingen. Maar op het moment is erbij de twee commerciële TV-zenders, vooral NessmaTv, eigendom van Berlusconi, nog weinig veranderd.’

Hoe verhoudt het streven naar een grondwetgevende vergadering zich tot deze vormen van zelf-organisatie?

‘De eis van een grondwetgevende vergadering werd het eerst geformuleerd door radicaal links maar de meeste mensen hadden er weinig interesse in. Maar sinds de val van Ben Ali steunt het ‘Front van 14 Januari’, dat alle radicaal linkse krachten verzamelt, de eis. Ik denk dat deze eis, of deze nu gehoor vindt of niet, uitdrukking geeft aan aan het verlangen naar democratische verandering en hoe meer lokale zelf-organisaties de eis overnemen, hoe meer het het een verzameling kan worden van het volk en niet slechts van een handjevol bobo’s. ‘

Ten slotte, hoe staat radicaal links in Tunesië ervoor?

‘Het zwaartepunt ligt bij ongeorganiseerde activisten. Het dozijn bestaande organisaties vertegenwoordigt nog geen tien procent van deze activisten in lokale comités, de vakbeweging enzovoorts. In de loop van de revolutie zelf moet de partij die de revolutie nodig heeft worden opgebouwd. Organisaties van radicaal links komen nu tevoorschijn uit de illegaliteit of worden nieuw gevormd. Ook als ze nieuwe mensen aantrekken, ontbreekt het hen aan middelen. We hopen dat iedereen die geïnspireerd is door onze revolutie ons wil steunen, bij wijze van wederdienst!

Te midden van muziek, poëzie en gepassioneerd debat werd de Tunesische sectie van de Vierde Internationale op 24 april herboren als de Ligue Ouvriere de Gauche. De voorganger van de LGO was de Organisation Communiste Révolutionnaire die ten tijde van Ben Ali onderdrukt werd. De LGO is een van verschillende linkse organisaties die na de val van de dictatuur weer bovengronds kan functioneren. De conferentie begon met een minuut stilte voor de omgekomen activisten. Onder de gasten waren activisten uit Libanon, Algerije, Pakistan, Brazilië, Italië, Zwitserland en Frankrijk.

Na jaren van repressie heeft de LGO te kampen met een groot tekort aan middelen. Internationaal wordt er geld ingezameld voor de organisatie, ook in Nederland. Giften kunnen worden overgemaakt naar 5571638, tnv Grenzeloos, ovv ‘Tunesië’.

 

 

 

Do you think that Mubarak’s pledge on February 1st not to contest the next election represented a victory for the movement, or was it just a trick to calm down the masses as on the very next day demonstrators in Al-Tahrir Square were brutally attacked by pro-Mubarak forces?

The Egyptian popular anti-regime uprising reached a first peak on February 1st, prodding Mubarak to announce concessions in the evening. It was an acknowledgement of the force of the popular protest and a clear retreat on the autocrat’s part, coming on top of the announcement of the government’s willingness to negotiate with the opposition. These were significant concessions indeed coming from such an authoritarian regime, and a testimony to the importance of the popular mobilisation. Mubarak even pledged to speed up ongoing judicial actions against fraud perpetrated during the previous parliamentary elections.

He made it clear, however, that he was not willing to go beyond that. With the army firmly on his side, he was trying to appease the mass movement, as well as the Western powers that were urging him to reform the political system. Short of resignation, he granted some of the key demands that the Egyptian protest movement had formulated initially, when it launched its campaign on January 25. However, the movement has radicalized since that day to a point where anything short of Mubarak’s resignation won’t be enough to satisfy it, with many in the movement even demanding that he gets tried in court.

Moreover, all the regime’s key institutions are now denounced by the movement as illegitimate––the executive as well as the legislative, i.e. the parliament. As a result, part of the opposition is demanding that the head of the constitutional court be appointed as interim president, to preside over the election of a constituent assembly. Others even want a national committee of opposition forces to supervise the transition. Of course, these demands constitute a radical democratic perspective. In order to impose such a thorough change, the mass movement would need to break or destabilise the regime’s backbone, that is the Egyptian army.

Do you mean that the Egyptian army is backing Mubarak?

Egypt––even more than comparable countries such as Pakistan or Turkey––is in essence a military dictatorship with a civilian façade that is itself stuffed with men originating in the military. The problem is that most of the Egyptian opposition, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood, have been sowing illusions about the army and its purported “neutrality,” if not “benevolence.” They have been depicting the army as an honest broker, while the truth is that the army as an institution is not “neutral” at all. If it has not been used yet to repress the movement, it is only because Mubarak and the general staff did not see it appropriate to resort to such a move, probably because they fear that the soldiers would be reluctant to carry out a repression. That is why the regime resorted instead to orchestrating counter-demonstrations and attacks by thugs on the protest movement. The regime tried to set up a semblance of civil strife, showing Egypt as torn apart between two camps, thus creating a justification for the army’s intervention as the “arbiter” of the situation.

If the regime managed to mobilise a significant counter-movement and provoke clashes on a larger scale, the army could step in, saying: “Game over, everybody must go home now,” while promising that the pledges made by Mubarak would be implemented. Like many observers, I feared these last two days that this stratagem might succeed in weakening the protest movement, but the huge mobilization of today’s “day of departure” is reassuring. The army will need to make further and more significant concessions to the popular uprising.

When you talk of the opposition, what forces does it include? Of course, we hear about the Muslim Brotherhood and El Baradei. Are there are other players too like left wing forces, trade unions, etc?

The Egyptian opposition includes a vast array of forces. There are parties like the Wafd, which are legal parties and constitute what may be called the liberal opposition. Then there is a grey zone occupied by the Muslim Brotherhood. It does not have a legal status but is tolerated by the regime. Its whole structure is visible; it is not an underground force. The Muslim Brotherhood is certainly, and by far, the largest force in the opposition. When Mubarak’s regime, under US pressure, granted some space to the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood––running as “independents”––managed to get 88 MPs, i.e. 20 percent of the parliamentary seats, despite all obstacles. In the last elections held last November and December, after the Mubarak regime had decided to close down the limited space that it had opened in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood almost vanished from parliament, losing all its seats but one.

Among the forces on the left, the largest is the Tagammu party, which enjoys a legal status and has 5 MPs. It refers to the Nasserite legacy. Communists have been prominent within its ranks. It is basically a reformist left party, which is not considered a threat to the regime. On the contrary, it has been quite compliant with it on several occasions. There are also leftwing Nasserite and radical left groups in Egypt––small but vibrant, and very much involved in the mass movement.

Then there are “civil society” movements, like Kefaya, a coalition of activists from various opposition forces initiated in solidarity with the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000. It opposed the invasion of Iraq later on, and became famous afterwards as a democratic campaign movement against Mubarak’s regime. From 2006 to 2009, Egypt saw the unfolding of a wave of industrial actions, including a few impressively massive workers strikes. There are no independent workers unions in Egypt, with one or two very recent exceptions born as a result of the social radicalisation. The bulk of the working class does not have the benefit of autonomous representation and organization. An attempt at convening a general strike on April 6, 2008 in solidarity with the workers led to the creation of the April 6 Youth Movement. Associations like this one and Kefaya are campaign-focused groups, not political parties, and they include people of different political affiliations along with unaffiliated activists.

When Mohamed El Baradei returned to Egypt in 2009 after his third term at the head of the IAEA, his personal prestige enhanced by the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, a liberal and left coalition gathered around him, with the Muslim Brotherhood adopting a lukewarm reserved position. Many in the opposition saw El Baradei as a powerful candidate enjoying international reputation and connections, and constituting therefore a credible presidential candidate against Mubarak or his son. El Baradei thus became a rallying figure for a large section of the opposition, regrouping political forces as well as personalities. They formed the National Association for Change.

This whole array of forces is very much involved in the present uprising. However, the overwhelming majority of the people on the streets are without any sort of political affiliation. It is a huge mass outpouring of resentment at living under a despotic regime, fed by worsening economic conditions, as prices of basic necessities, like food, fuel, and electricity, have been sharply on the rise amid staggering joblessness. This is the case not only in Egypt but in most of the region as well, and that is why the fire of revolt that started in Tunisia spread so quickly to many Arab countries.

Is El Baradei genuinely popular, or is he in some way the Mir-Hossein Mousavi of the Egyptian movement, trying to change some faces while preserving the regime?

I would disagree with this characterisation of Mousavi in the first place. To be sure, Mir-Hossein Mousavi did not want to “change the regime” if one mean by that a social revolution. But there was definitely a clash between authoritarian social forces, spearheaded by the Pasdaran and represented by Ahmedinejad, and others coalesced around a liberal reformist perspective represented by Mousavi. It was indeed a clash about the kind of “regime” in the sense of the pattern of political rule.

Mohamed El Baradei is a genuine liberal who wishes his country to move from the present dictatorship to a liberal democratic regime, with free elections and political freedoms. If such a vast array of political forces is willing to cooperate with him, it is because they see in him the most credible liberal alternative to the existing regime, a man who does not command an organised constituency of his own, and is therefore an appropriate figurehead for a democratic change.

Going back to your analogy, you can’t compare him with Mousavi who was a member of the Iranian regime, one of the men who led the 1979 Islamic revolution. Mousavi had his own followers in Iran, before he emerged as the leader of the 2009 mass protest movement. In Egypt, El Baradei cannot play, and does not pretend to play a similar role. He is supported by a vast array of forces, but none of them see him as its leader.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s initial reserved attitude towards El Baradei is partly related to the fact that he does not have a religious bent and is too secular for their taste. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood had cultivated an ambiguous relationship with the regime over the years. Had they fully backed El Baradei, they would have narrowed their margin of negotiation with the Mubarak regime, with which they have been bargaining for quite a long time. The regime conceded a lot to them in the socio-cultural sphere, increasing  Islamic censorship in the cultural field being but one example. That was the easiest thing the regime could do to appease the Brotherhood. As a result, Egypt made huge steps backward from the secularisation that was consolidated under Gamal Abdul-Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s goal is to secure a democratic change that would grant them the possibility to take part in free elections, both parliamentary and presidential. The model they aspire to reproduce in Egypt is that of Turkey, where the democratisation process was controlled by the military with the army remaining a key pillar of the political system. This process nonetheless created a space which allowed the AKP, an Islamic conservative party, to win elections. They are not bent on overthrowing the state, hence their courting of the military and their care to avoid any gesture that could antagonize the army. They adhere to a strategy of gradual conquest of power: they are gradualists, not radicals.

The Western media are hinting at the fact that democracy in the Middle East would lead to an Islamic fundamentalist takeover. We have seen the triumphal return of Rached Ghannouchi to Tunisia after long years in exile. The Muslim Brotherhood is likely to win fair elections in Egypt. What is your comment on that?

I would turn the whole question around. I would say that it is the lack of democracy that led religious fundamentalist forces to occupy such a space. Repression and the lack of political freedoms reduced considerably the possibility for left-wing, working-class and feminist movements to develop in an environment of worsening social injustice and economic degradation. In such conditions, the easiest venue for the expression of mass protest turns out to be the one that uses the most readily and openly available channels. That’s how the opposition got dominated by forces adhering to religious ideologies and programmes.

We aspire to a society where such forces are free to defend their views, but in an open and democratic ideological competition between all political currents. In order for Middle Eastern societies to get back on the track of political secularisation, back to the popular critical distrust of the political exploitation of religion that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, they need to acquire the kind of political education that can be achieved only through a long-term practise of democracy.

Having said this, the role of religious parties is different in different countries. True, Rached Ghannouchi has been welcomed by a few thousand people on his arrival at Tunis airport. But his Nahda movement has much less influence in Tunisia than the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Of course, this is in part because Al-Nahda suffered from harsh repression since the 1990s. But it is also because the Tunisian society is less prone than the Egyptian to religious fundamentalist ideas, due to its higher degree of Westernisation and education, and the country’s history.

But there is no doubt that Islamic parties have become the major forces in the opposition to existing regimes over the whole region. It will take a protracted democratic experience to change the direction of winds from that which has been prevailing for more than three decades. The alternative is the Algerian scenario where an electoral process was blocked by the army by way of a military coup in 1992, leading to a devastating civil war for which Algeria is still paying the price.

The amazing surge of democratic aspirations among Arab peoples of these last few weeks is very encouraging indeed. Neither in Tunisia, nor in Egypt or anywhere else, were popular protests waged for religious programs, or even led principally by religious forces. These are democratic movements, displaying a strong longing for democracy. Polls have been showing for many years that democracy as a value is rated very highly in Middle Eastern countries, contrary to common “Orientalist” prejudices about the cultural “incompatibility” of Muslim countries with democracy. The ongoing events prove one more time that any population deprived of freedom will eventually stand up for democracy, whatever “cultural sphere” it belongs to.

Whoever runs and wins future free elections in the Middle East will have to face a society where the demand for democracy has become very strong indeed. It will be quite difficult for any party––whatever its programme––to hijack these aspirations. I am not saying that it will be impossible. But one major outcome of the ongoing events is that popular aspirations to democracy have been hugely boosted. They create ideal conditions for the left to rebuild itself as an alternative.


Farooq Sulehria interviewed leading Arab scholar-activist Gilbert Achcar on February 4. Gilbert Achcar, who grew up in Lebanon, is professor of development studies and international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London, and author most recently of The Arabs and the Holocaust: the Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2010.

In the name of ‘deficit reduction’, the ConDem coalition has launched a reactionary onslaught against all working people in this country. They want to make us pay for the economic crisis that was not of our making by reducing the debt by £81 billion over four years. To do this they have launched a massive programme of cutting pay, benefits and pensions, slashing public services, and privatisation, including most of the NHS.

The alternative now emerging on the left is government-led state investment and nationalization to stimulate sustainable development. Socialist Resistance supports such measures, while recognising this can only lead to a temporary alleviation of the situation for working people. But in the long run we need to mobilise and fight for a government that is prepared to directly confront the power of capital and challenge the legitimacy of the debt by an audit, tax the wealth of the rich, and make them pay for the crisis they have created. The need for a broad party of the left willing to meet these challenges head-on is more urgent than ever.

CAN CAPITALISM ‘SOLVE’ THE DEBT CRISIS?

Tuesday 8 February

7.30pm, ULU, Malet Street, WC1E 7HY

Speakers: Ozlem Onaran (Middlesex University) & Stathis Kouvelakis (King’s College)

Socialist Resistance has a new pamphlet on the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. You can read it below. For a copy, send three first class stamps and your address to our office.

Socialist Resistance has a new pamphlet on the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. You can read it below. For a copy, send three first class stamps and your address to our office.

An “International Declaration of Support for the Tunisian Revolution” is being supported by the Fourth International. To add your name, please send an e-mail with surnames, first names, position/organisation, and country to: solidaritytunisia@gmail.com .

The Tunisian Revolution is beautiful. Spontaneously, without directives, without organization,
the Tunisian people have risen up to overthrow Ben Ali, a dictator who had at his disposal a
powerful police machinery and many tentacles, a dictator supported by all major powers under
the false pretext that it constituted a “wall against Islam.” Almost unanimously with “Ben Ali
Get Out” as the main slogan, the Tunisian people triumphed against the predatory despot who
ruled over them. Within weeks of intensive mobilizations driven by the tragic sacrifice of a street
vendor from one of the most disadvantaged regions of the country, the history of Tunisia, and
perhaps the entire Arab world, has been shaken.
Beyond this first success, the mobilization continues since everyone knows that the major
institutions set up by the deposed president continue to function. Against the forces of
normalization, the forces of change demand in the first place the dissolution of the Constitutional
Democratic Rally (RCD), which more than a political party is an organ of repression,
surveillance and clientelization. Everyone knows that without a real break from the institutions
set up by the dictator, the popular masses that led the revolutionary movement, particularly
youth, run the risk of being deprived of their victory in the name of a smooth transition that
would provide no more than some minimal concessions from the demands of the people, similar
to what Ben Ali “generously” offered a handful of hours before being hunted by powerful
popular demonstrations. Everyone knows that Tunisians do not expect a façade of democracy,
nor do they in any way want an economic policy dictated by the European Union and
international financial institutions, whose neo-liberal credo always leads to more unemployment
and misery. They in no way want a foreign policy subjected to the interests of imperial powers in
a hurry to end the Palestinian Resistance. Everyone in Tunisia knows that the shock wave this
Revolution has had in the whole Arab world is a formidable achievement that raises much hope
and, consequently, disappointment would be disastrous.
Historical experience has shown that, confronted with dynamics of this magnitude, the powerful
of the world over, those who perpetuate oppression and exploitation, will not stop to reduce its
reach, cut its roots and, if the threat persists, destroy it with violence. In Tunisia, as could happen
in other places, we have no doubt that some, starting mostly from within the services of the
imperialist states, are preparing the counter-revolution to repress the popular mobilization once
and for all.
This is why we, activists, intellectuals, citizens, all committed to democracy and social justice,
we welcome the Tunisian people and its Revolution of dignity. We give our unconditional
solidarity in their efforts to deepen the democratic process and we commit to be on their side to
preserve their achievements and to oppose all counter-revolutionary attempts.

At a meeting immediately following Saturday 22nd January’s NSSN anti-cuts conference, the majority of NSSN (National Shop Stewards Network) national officers-all of those not in the Socialist Party- have resigned.

This is the statement of four of these officers: Dave Chapple, Bob Archer, George Binette and Becca Kirkpatrick:

“1.We are all NSSN national officers. We have decided that we cannot continue to be activists in an organisation that, following the conference decision on 22nd January, is now controlled by the Socialist Party.

The NSSN was established to become a strong independent organisation of trades union activists, with trades council and trades union branch affiliates.

Its meetings cannot function as independent voting bodies if all major decisions are to be taken beforehand by the Socialist Party.

None of our trades council or trade union branch affiliates can continue to be linked to the NSSN on that basis.

2. 22nd January’s NSSN conference decision to set up a separate NSSN-led anti-cuts campaign-the third such organisation that exists-is a major strategic mistake for our part of the trade union movement.

It makes unity of the national anti-cuts movement harder not easier.

The essential NSSN anti-cuts task, of stiffening the resolve of the trades unions, locally and nationally, to fight cuts through co-ordinated strike action, will be set aside or de-prioritised.

It will ensure that the regional and local SSN groups-already weak and struggling in the main- will wither as they transfer time and energy to establishing-or duplicating-local anti-cuts campaigns.

At the Steering Committee of December 4th, six national officers and EVERY NON-SP STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBER voted against this proposal, yet the Socialist Party has ignored this feeling despite our further appeals, knowing full well that our continued participation in the NSSN would be intolerable.

3. Ninety NSSN activists met after the end of that Saturday’s conference and unanimously decided to continue the work of trade union activists’ solidarity on an organised national basis. Please get in touch.”

Dave Chapple, NSSN Chair; George Binnette, NSSN Treasurer;
Bob Archer, NSSN Communications Officer; Becca Kirkpatrick, NSSN Affiliations Officer
davechapple@btinternet.com 01278 450562

Reporters Without Borders and Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka (JDS), a network of exiled Sri Lankan journalists, announce the launch of an international appeal already signed by Noam Chomsky, Arundathi Roy, Ken Loach, Antony Loewenstein and Tariq Ali, asking writers and intellectuals to endorse a campaign for more freedom of expression in Sri Lanka.

In a few days, the family and colleagues of political cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda will be commemorating the first anniversary of his disappearance. He was kidnapped in the heavily-guarded capital, Colombo, on 24 January 2010, a few hours before the most recent presidential elections. The authorities have never given his wife any information about where he might be and the investigation is in limbo.

At the same time, writers from Asia and all over the world are planning to gather in the southern city of Galle for a literary festival co-sponsored by the country’s leading tourism promotion agencies (http://www.galleliteraryfestival.com). Reporters Without Borders and JDS find it highly disturbing that literature is being celebrated in this manner in a land where cartoonists, journalists, writers and dissident voices are so often victimized by the current government. The signatories of this appeal ask them to consider this grave situation before deciding to go to the Galle Festival.

Full version of the Galle Appeal

We urge you who have been invited to attend the fifth Galle Literary Festival (26-30 January 2011) to consider Sri Lanka’s appalling human rights record and targeting of journalists. Reporters without Borders said this about Sri Lanka in a recent report: “Murders, physical attacks, kidnappings, threats and censorship continue in Sri Lanka despite the end of the civil war. The most senior government officials, including the defence secretary (the President’s brother), are directly implicated in serious press freedom violations affecting both Tamil and Sinhalese journalists.”

We believe this is not the right time for prominent international writers like you to give legitimacy to the Sri Lankan government’s suppression of free speech by attending a conference that does not in any way push for greater freedom of expression inside that country.

The second anniversary of journalist and cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda’s disappearance will be on 24 January 2011, just two days before the Galle Literary Festival begins. He went missing in the capital city after writing a column praising the opposition candidate in the presidential election. The police have failed to conduct a credible investigation into his disappearance. Today, because Prageeth chose to do what you do – express an opinion – his two young sons are without a father.

Another renowned journalist, Lasantha Wickremetunga, was gunned down in the capital on 8 January 2009. Although his murder took place in a high-security area where security forces personnel were manning roadblocks, his killers were allowed to escape. In a chilling editorial published posthumously, Mr. Wickremetunga said: “When I am finally killed, it will be the government who killed me.”

Fourteen journalists have been killed since 2006, three have disappeared, and more than 30 have fled the country. Journalists, writers and performers remaining in the country are constantly threatened, physically attacked or cowed by legislation under which they can be jailed them for up to 20 years simply for what they write.

The stifling of free expression has also had a negative impact on other freedoms in Sri Lanka. For instance, it was because journalists were not permitted to cover the war between the government and rebel LTTE that so many atrocities took place, including alleged war crimes. While mounting evidence of Sri Lanka’s war crimes is being shown around the world, journalists inside the country cannot talk about them or even visit the northern areas because they are afraid that they will disappear or be killed.

It is this environment that you will be legitimizing by your presence.

We ask you in the great tradition of solidarity that binds writers together everywhere, to stand with your brothers and sisters in Sri Lanka who are not allowed to speak out. We ask that by your actions you send a clear message that, unless and until the disappearance of Prageeth is investigated and there is a real improvement in the climate for free expression in Sri Lanka, you cannot celebrate writing and the arts in Galle.

Signatories,

Noam Chomsky
Arundathi Roy
Ken Loach
Antony Loewenstein
Tariq Ali
Dave Rampton
R. Cheran